A Jury of Your [Redacted]: The Rise and Implications of Anonymous Juries by Mangat, Leonardo
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Library Prize for Exemplary Student
Research Papers Cornell Law Student Papers
5-2018
A Jury of Your [Redacted]: The Rise and
Implications of Anonymous Juries
Leonardo Mangat
lm734@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cllsrp
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Cornell Law Student Papers at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Library Prize for Exemplary Student Research Papers by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mangat, Leonardo, "A Jury of Your [Redacted]: The Rise and Implications of Anonymous Juries" (2018). Cornell Law Library Prize for
Exemplary Student Research Papers. 15.
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cllsrp/15
1  
 
A JURY OF YOUR [REDACTED]: THE RISE AND IMPLICATIONS OF ANONYMOUS 
JURIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The jury is part and parcel of our legal tradition.
1 
Since “time out of mind,”
2 
juries—a 
group of people empowered to decide facts and render verdicts
3
—were used in England before 
 
 
 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI 
(“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”); 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”). Interestingly, 
the Constitution contained no specific provision for a jury in civil trials. At least one Founding Father contended 
that the absence of a specific provision did not mean that the right was entirely abolished. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
2 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349–50. 
3 Jury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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finding purchase first in the Colonies, and then in the United States.
4 
The jury, like other aspects 
of the trial, has witnessed its share of innovations throughout time.
5 
Some innovations trace their 
genesis to the Founding.
6 
Others claim descent from the changing views of American society.
7 
The anonymous jury, however, is of recent vintage.
8 
A group of nameless—potentially 
featureless
9
—people sit in judgment and mete out verdicts, in apparent contradiction to our 
democratic ideals of a free and open society. Since 1977, when the first completely anonymous 
jury was empaneled in a federal court in New York,
10 
they have been used across a litany of 
cases: organized crime,
11 
terrorism,
12 
murder,
13 
sporting scandals,
14 
police killings,
15 
and even  in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN & EDIE GREENE, THE JURY UNDER FIRE: MYTH, CONTROVERSY, AND REFORM 3 
(2017). 
5 See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 66–70 (2007) (discussing the 
historical development in the way jurors are selected from the community). 
6 See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 32–36 (1986) (discussing a colonial jury’s 
involvement in developing the idea of freedom of the press). 
7 See, e.g., VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 5, at 71–73 (noting the shift towards jury representativeness as an 
ideal in the years following the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
8 See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In Exigent Circumstances Only, 13 
ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 457, 457–58 (1999) (“[In 1977] a federal trial judge in the Southern District of New 
York empaneled the first fully anonymous jury in American history.”). The Ninth Circuit, however, anonymized 
some juror information before the seventies. Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that 
jurors’ addresses may be withheld). 
9 See infra subpart I.B. 
10 See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 8. 
11 See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Arnold H. Lubasch, Jurors in Gotti 
Case to Be Sequestered and Not Identified, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/15/nyregion/jurors-in-gotti-case-to-be-sequestered-and-not-identified.html 
(reporting that jurors will be innominate in the trial of infamous mob boss John Gotti). 
12 E.g., Neil Harvey, Jurors in Neo-Nazi Trial Will Remain Anonymous, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 23, 2013, at A1. 
13 See, e.g., Diane Dimond, Casey Anthony Jurors Fear Threats After Identities Revealed Oct. 25, DAILY BEAST 
(Oct. 23, 2011, 10:59 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/casey-anthony-jurors-fear-threats-after-identities- 
revealed-oct-25 (reporting juror fear regarding their names being released after the trial of Casey Anthony). 
14 E.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz, FIFA Trial Opens With References to Cash Drops and Bag Men, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/sports/soccer/fifa-trial-marin-napout-burga.html. 
15 E.g., Carrie Johnson, Why Courts Use Anonymous Juries, Like in Freddie Gray Case, NPR (Nov. 30, 2015, 
4:46 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/11/30/457905697/why-courts-use-anonymous-juries-like- 
in-freddie-gray-case (noting that the judge in the Freddie Gray police brutality case empaneled a completely 
anonymous jury). 
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cases of gubernatorial political corruption.
16  
And their use is on the rise.
17   
An anonymous jury 
is a type of jury that a court, upon its own or the parties’ motion, may choose to empanel in a 
criminal trial; if an anonymous jury is used, information that might identify jurors is withheld 
from the parties or the public, often for varying lengths of time. Anonymous juries, 
understandably, raise questions regarding a defendant’s presumption of innocence, the public’s 
right to an open trial, judicial discretion, and the impacts of anonymity on juror decisionmaking. 
In the absence of Supreme Court precedent, courts have fashioned various approaches to the 
issue.
18 
The anonymous jury is unquestionably a potent tool that affords a court great flexibility 
to meet the exigencies of a trial head-on. But its extraordinary characteristics counsel care in its 
empanelment. 
This Note begins in Part I by providing an overview of the jury, focusing particularly on the 
definitional issue regarding the myriad configurations an “anonymous jury” takes. Next, Part II 
provides a survey of various standards federal and state courts use in empaneling anonymous 
juries.  Then, Part III analyzes the various implications that arise when an anonymous jury is 
used and concludes that the definitional ambiguity, broad discretion, and insufficient juror 
accountability under the majority test employed across courts are detrimental to the jury’s 
underlying principles and warrant a different approach. Finally, Part IV proposes a solution— 
adopting the Seventh Circuit’s approach to anonymous juries and requiring reasoned verdicts 
 
 
 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2010); see also BJ Lutz, Blagojevich 
Jurors to Remain Anonymous, NBC CHI. (Feb. 8, 2011, 8:51 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward- 
room/Blagovevich-Jurors-to-Remain-Anonymous-115612614.html (reporting that jurors’ names in former Illinois 
Governor Rod Blagojevich’s retrial will remain anonymous throughout the trial). 
17 Dean Seal, Called ‘Drastic,’ Anonymous Juries Nevertheless Rising in Use, DAILY PROGRESS (Jan. 30, 
2016), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/called-drastic-anonymous-juries-nevertheless-rising-in- 
use/article_be05c22a-6b8e-5d93-a9aa-455d1241aa11.html. 
18 See infra Part II. 
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when an anonymous jury is empaneled—and provides an illustration of the proposed test to a 
modern case: high-profile cases of law enforcement violence. 
 
I 
 
THE JURY AND ANONYMITY 
 
A. A Brief Background on the Jury 
 
Among our societal institutions, the jury occupies a unique place at the confluence of the 
state, of civil society, and of political society.
19 
In Williams v. Florida, the Supreme Court 
proclaimed that the “essential feature” of a jury is two-fold: its interposing of “commonsense 
judgment of a group of laymen” between litigants and the resulting “community participation 
and shared responsibility” jurors experience after completing their service.
20 
Indeed, both the 
original states and each state that subsequently joined the Union guarantee some form of jury 
trial.
21   
Before the jury may serve, however, it must first be selected. 
Voir dire is the investigative jury selection process, employed across courts nationwide, 
 
used to empanel an ideal, representative jury—a jury composed of a fair, random cross-section of 
the community.
22 
During the process, judges and attorneys question prospective jurors, called 
venirepersons,
23  
to determine whether that person is legally qualified to serve and can remain 
 
 
 
19 See JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC 
ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 15–17 (2010). Indeed, jury service is a duty for all citizens. See 
Scott Simon, Even (Former) Presidents Have to Go to Jury Duty, NPR (Nov. 11, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/11/563409708/even-former-presidents-have-to-go-to-jury-duty (noting that even 
former Presidents, including former President Obama, have been called for jury duty). 
20 See 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
21 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968). 
22 VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 5, at 74. 
23 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618–19 (1991). 
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impartial and unbiased toward the parties.
24 
Notably, the judge enjoys broad discretion in 
conducting voir dire.
25 
And this discretion extends to anonymity. Generally, voir dire marks the 
beginning of an anonymous jury.
26 
Indeed, various courts have termed a jury anonymous, 
withholding some combination of juror names, addresses, work information, or even ethnic 
backgrounds, from the beginning of voir dire.
27 
This raises a threshold question: What does the 
term “anonymous jury” mean? Courts have appended the “anonymous jury” label to various 
configurations of anonymity. 
 
B. The Amorphous Definition of Anonymity 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the spectrum of anonymity among the various anonymous 
juries empaneled is as broad as the discretion the judge possesses to empanel them. A clear 
understanding of the several types of anonymity found within the “anonymous jury” label, 
therefore, is necessary in order to properly evaluate the implications of anonymous juries on the 
court, the public, and the parties. In contradistinction to the “usual case”
28 
of a routinely selected 
jury, a jury is anonymous when certain information that would otherwise be available to the 
 
 
 
24 BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 38. An in-depth treatment of voir dire is outside the scope of this 
Note. See generally CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES (William A. Masterson ed., 1986) 
[hereinafter TRIAL PRACTICE], for a detailed discussion of the various stages of the trial process, including voir dire. 
25 See FED. R. CIV. P. 47 (“The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to examine prospective jurors or 
may itself do so.” (emphasis added)); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931); cf. Stilson v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (“There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the 
Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is 
secured.”). 
26 Though beyond the scope of this Note, there are other techniques, such as jury sequestration or gag orders, 
through which juror information might effectively be anonymized. See generally Jaime N. Morris, The Anonymous 
Accused: Protecting Defendants’ Rights in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REV. 901 (2003) (discussing 
jury sequestration and gag orders in highly publicized criminal cases). 
27 E.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 133–37 (2d Cir. 1979) (assigning jurors’ numbers for 
identification purposes and withholding their identities, residences, and ethnic backgrounds). 
28 United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 n.22 (11th Cir. 1994) (“In the usual case, the parties know the 
names, addresses, and occupations of potential jurors, as well as those of any spouses.”). 
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parties and court is withheld.
29 
Juror anonymity may thus be conceptualized on four axes: the 
quantity of information anonymized, the amount of parties barred from the anonymized 
information, the duration of anonymity, and the nature of the anonymized information divulged 
post-trial. 
Myriad juror information may be anonymized, such as the jurors’ names, ages, addresses, 
levels of education, and types of employment; the degree of anonymized information varies 
depending on the exigencies of the case.
30   
Among the least anonymizing forms of an 
anonymous jury is the “innominate jury”: a jury in which the only piece of information withheld 
from the parties are the names of the jurors.
31   
A more anonymizing form of an anonymous jury 
is the aptly named “numbers jury,” in which jurors are identified in court by a number instead of 
their name.
32  
Even within the term “numbers jury,” however, disagreement exists as to the 
precise contours of that term.
33 
On the other end of the anonymity spectrum, courts have 
anonymized much more information. For example, in United States v. Ross, the court empaneled 
an anonymous jury that withheld the jurors’ “names, addresses, places of employment, and 
spouses’ names and places of employment.”
34 
Notably, the Ross court withheld this information 
from the outset of the trial.
35
 
Moreover, from whom—the parties, the public, the court, or counsel—juror information is 
 
 
 
29 See State v. Sandoval, 788 N.W.2d 172, 194 (Neb. 2010). 
30 Id. at 326–28. 
31 See United States v. Bowman, 302 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002). 
32 Sandoval, 788 N.W.2d at 194 (noting that although jurors were identified in court by a number, counsel, but 
not the defendant, knew the names of potential jurors). 
33 See Perez v. People, 302 P.3d 222, 225–26 (Colo. 2013) (referring to a jury in which jurors were identified in 
court by a number and both counsel and defendant knew the names of jurors as a numbers jury). 
34 United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994). 
35 Id. Moreover, the court ordered the jurors to meet in a location from which federal marshals would escort 
them to and from the courthouse; this was done out of concerns for security and presumably anonymity. Id. 
7  
 
withheld likewise varies. The common case involves the court withholding information from the 
public.
36 
Withholding information from the public, of course, intuitively raises questions 
regarding whether constitutional issues are implicated; these issues are discussed in Part III 
below. Courts have also withheld juror information from the defendant and the public; in Ross, 
for example, the court withheld the juror information previously mentioned from both the 
defendant and the public, reasoning that the defendant had “previously attempted to interfere 
with the judicial process” and that “harmful pretrial publicity had occurred.”
37 
In another case, a 
court disclosed juror information to the defendant’s counsel, but ordered that they not disclose 
the information to anyone, including the defendant.
38
 
Furthermore, the timing when it comes to releasing previously withheld information and the 
 
extent of the information divulged varies. For example, in United States v. Brown, the court 
empaneled an anonymous jury and took a particularly stringent approach toward timing and 
information divulged when it denied a news media request for juror information post-verdict.
39 
Courts have, on the other hand, imposed durational limits on anonymity; in United States v. 
Doherty, for example, the court allowed juror information to be withheld from the public for 
only seven days post-verdict.
40 
Moreover, even if courts choose to lift the veil of anonymity, 
they might nevertheless not divulge all previously anonymized information. Courts might, for 
example, completely withhold all information, as in Brown,
41  
but they might also release 
 
 
36 See, e.g., United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
37 See Ross, 33 F.3d at 1519. 
38 State v. Sandoval, 788 N.W.2d 172, 194 (Neb. 2010). 
39 250 F.3d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 2001). 
40 675 F. Supp. 719, 725 (D. Mass. 1987) (“Lifting the [anonymity] order seven days after the return of the 
verdict thus accommodates all the relevant interests.”). 
41 Brown, 250 F.3d at 918. 
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anonymized information in a generalized way so as to preserve a heightened degree of 
anonymity that detailed information would not have. Consider, for example, United States v. 
Melendez, where the court did not divulge the jurors’ first names, specific addresses, and places 
of employment, but did divulge their surnames, counties and general areas of residence, and 
types of employment.
42
 
In sum, courts have approached the label of anonymous juries in myriad ways. Indeed, the 
broad discretion involved in empaneling an anonymous jury—a matter of “trial 
administration”
43
—gives courts wide latitude in determining exactly what form their anonymous 
jury will take. In fact, courts might withhold a variety of juror information as early as voir dire. 
Furthermore, courts might withhold the information from some of the parties, from the public, or 
it might withhold the information solely from the defendant, while allowing counsel access. 
Moreover, courts might set deadlines for disclosure, and, even upon disclosure, courts retain 
discretion with regards to the type and specificity of information divulged. Thus, there exists a 
wide spectrum bookended by the routine, non-anonymous jury on one end and the completely 
anonymous jury on the other. There is not, however, a uniform framework for empaneling an 
anonymous jury. Indeed, various approaches exist among federal and state courts regarding 
when an anonymous jury might properly be empaneled. 
 
II 
 
ANONYMOUS JURIES AMONG THE COURTS 
 
Though the anonymous jury is but a few decades removed from its inception—a mere fry in 
 
 
 
42 743 F. Supp. 134, 138–39 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
43 See United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
9  
 
the ocean of jury history—it has proliferated far and wide among both federal and state courts. 
Judicial power to empanel an anonymous jury is variously derived from local court rules, 
statutes, or common law. Notably, the United States Supreme Court has yet to squarely address 
anonymous juries: it has provided neither the circumstances in which an anonymous jury may be 
empaneled nor the analytical framework to determine whether an anonymous jury has been 
properly empaneled.
44 
Accordingly, various standards governing anonymous juries have arisen 
among federal and state courts. Before examining the anonymous jury in the modern context, 
however, an overview of the seminal case that produced this “judicial fluke”
45  
is instructive. 
In United States v. Barnes, Judge Werker of the Southern District of New York empaneled 
 
the first completely anonymous jury in the trial of Leroy “Nicky” Barnes.
46   
Barnes, crime boss 
of the then-largest heroin distribution network in Harlem,
47 
was tried along with fourteen co- 
defendants on a litany of charges including conspiracy, engaging in a continuing criminal 
enterprise, violating narcotics laws, and firearm possession.
48 
Notably, there were no threats to 
potential jurors before trial; government officials, however, received an anonymous telephone 
call that threatened to murder one of the Government’s witnesses, who was being held in 
protective custody, if the witness cooperated with the Government at trial.
49 
This threat was not 
unfounded: before the trial began, another potential witness against Barnes was found dead.
50  
At 
 
44 See United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[The United States Supreme Court] has 
[not] decided under what circumstances, and after what procedures, jurors’ names may be kept confidential.”). 
45 Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 8, at 458. 
46 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979). 
47 Barnes himself has told his story across myriad media. See generally LEROY BARNES & TOM FOLSOM, MR. 
UNTOUCHABLE (2007) (detailing Barnes’ criminal enterprise; his subsequent arrest, trial, and conviction; and his 
later life as state’s evidence); MR. UNTOUCHABLE (Magnolia Pictures 2007) (same). 
48 Barnes, 604 F.2d at 130–31. 
49 Id. at 136 (“[The Government] was called by an anonymous caller who allegedly said, about [the witness]: ‘If 
he does anything, he’ll be dead.’”). 
50 Id. at 137 n.7 (“Indeed, on the eve of trial, in September 1977, a potential witness Shepard Franklin, was 
10  
 
trial, the court rejected the prosecution’s motion to sequester the jury and instead prohibited 
disclosure of the venirepersons’ names, addresses, religion, and ethnic backgrounds.
51 
Moreover, the trial judge neither solicited the views of either party nor did he allow any 
challenges to the procedure during trial.
52 
Ultimately, Barnes and ten of his co-defendants were 
found guilty.
53 
The defendants appealed, arguing that the anonymous jury violated their due 
process.
54   
The Second Circuit was unpersuaded.
55   
It noted that neither statutory nor 
constitutional law compelled blanket disclosure of juror information.
56   
With regards to voir dire, 
the Second Circuit, after examining precedent, stated that all that was required was “some 
questioning as to identifiable issues connected in some way with persons, places, or things likely 
to arise during the trial.”
57   
After noting the perils of organized crime investigations, threat of 
jury tampering, media harassment of jurors, and the broad discretion a trial judge enjoys in 
conducting the trial,
58  
the Second Circuit explained that anonymity “comported with [the 
Court’s] obligation to protect the jury, to assure its privacy, and to avoid all possible mental 
blocks against impartiality.”
59   
The Second Circuit thus upheld the empanelment of an 
 
 
reportedly murdered at the Harlem River Motors Garage—the site of much of the trafficking in this case.” (citation 
omitted)). 
51 Id. at 135. 
52 Id. at 169 (“[E]very time counsel for the defendants sought to challenge the district court’s ruling, either 
orally or in writing, their requests were sharply denied.”). 
53 Id. at 133 (majority opinion). Barnes’ conviction on the charge of continuing criminal enterprise resulted in a 
life sentence. Id. at 156. 
54 Id. at 133. 
55 Id. at 142–43. 
56 See id. at 144.  The Second Circuit acknowledged the existence of 18 U.S.C. § 3432, which requires 
disclosure of potential jurors’ names and addresses, but noted its inapplicability to non-capital cases.  Id. at 143 n.11. 
57 Id. at 139. 
58 Id. at 137 (“A general principle of law thus has been developed that the trial judge has broad discretion in 
conducting the voir dire, as he does in his conduct of the trial generally.” (citations omitted)). 
59 Id. at 141. The Second Circuit, additionally, pointed to the fact that two defendants were entirely acquitted as 
indicative that all the defendants were accorded all process due. See id. at 143 n.12. But see Christopher Keleher, 
The Repercussions of Anonymous Juries, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 531, 536–37 (2010) (describing Barnes and another 
co-defendant’s semi-botched attempt to bribe an acquaintance that had been selected as a juror in their case). 
11  
 
anonymous jury and provided the principles that underlie its use to this day.
60
 
 
A. Federal Courts 
 
Since their spontaneous beginnings in the Northeast, anonymous juries have spread across 
the United States—every circuit has empaneled an anonymous jury.
61 
Most circuits, although 
requiring some evidence that warrants anonymity, adhere to a similar test that empowers the trial 
judge with broad discretion to empanel an anonymous jury. 
Across the majority of federal circuit courts, an anonymous jury may be empaneled if two 
conditions are met. The trial court must first “conclud[e] that there is [a] strong reason to believe 
the jury needs protection”; if that condition is met, then the court must take “reasonable 
precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant and to ensure that [the 
defendant’s] fundamental rights are protected.”
62 
If this two-pronged test is met, then an 
anonymous jury may be properly empaneled. Several factors have been articulated to guide trial 
judges when determining whether the first prong has been satisfied. In empaneling anonymous 
juries, courts generally consider: (1) the defendant’s involvement in organized crime; (2) the 
defendant’s participation in a group with the capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendant’s past 
attempts to interfere with the judicial process or witnesses; (4) the potential that, if convicted, the 
 
 
 
60 Barnes, 604 F.2d at 143. Not all Judges agreed with the result reached. See id. at 170–74 (Meskill, J., 
dissenting) (noting with concern that anonymity could not guarantee impartiality and undermined peremptory 
challenges). The Supreme Court, however, denied the petition for writ of certiorari. United States v. Barnes, 446 
U.S. 907 (1980). 
61 See, e.g., United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ramirez-Rivera, 800 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948 (9th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 
1995); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 
1991); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1988); Yates v. McKune, No. 05-3373, 2007 WL 2155652 
(D. Kan. July 26, 2007). 
62 See Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192 (citations omitted). 
12  
 
defendant’s will suffer a lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary penalties; and (5) 
whether extensive publicity exists that could enhance the possibility that jurors’ names would 
become public and expose them to intimidation and harassment.
63 
With regards to the test’s 
second prong, courts have given curative instructions to mitigate the prejudicial risk anonymous 
empanelment poses; instead of focusing on juror safety from the defendant as justification for 
anonymity, these instructions typically attribute anonymity toward the need to protect the jury 
from harassment from the media.
64 
The decision whether to empanel an anonymous jury is 
“entitled to deference and is subject to abuse of discretion review.”
65   
Some circuits, however, 
 
 
63 Krout, 66 F.3d at 1427; see also United States v. Mostafa, 7 F. Supp. 3d 334, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(“[T]hree factors that a district court should examine [to determine whether to empanel an anonymous jury are]: (1) 
whether the charges against the defendant are serious, (2) whether there is a substantial potential threat of corruption 
to the judicial process, and (3) whether considerable media coverage of the trial is anticipated.”). 
64 Shryock, 342 F.3d at 972–73.  United States v. Thomas exemplifies a typical instruction: 
Now, this should be a very interesting case. Undoubtedly, it could receive considerable publicity, 
newspaper, radio and television. The media and the public may be curious concerning the identity of 
the participants, the witnesses, the lawyers and the jurors. That curiosity and its resultant comments 
might come to the attention of the jury selected here and possibly impair its impartiality by 
viewpoints expressed, comments made, opinions, inquiries and so forth. 
 
Now, such outside influences could tend to distort what goes on in court, the evidence, and be 
distracting and divert the attention of the jury, and it might result in people prying into personal 
affairs of the participants, including those selected as jurors, who are selected only to judge the 
evidence in the case that can legally come before you, and thus to distort and distract attention from 
the case. 
 
Consequently, taking into consideration all the circumstances, I have decided that in selecting those 
who will serve as the jury your name, your address and your place of employment will remain 
anonymous during the trial of this case, and that’s the reason why you have been given numbers. 
 
This will serve to ward off curiosity and seekers for information that might otherwise infringe on 
your privacy and it will aid in insulating and sheltering you from unwanted and undesirable publicity 
and embarrassment and notoriety and any access to you which would interfere with preserving your 
sworn duty to fairly, impartially and independently serve as jurors. It will permit the media complete 
freedom of coverage of this trial. 
United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1365 n.1 (2d Cir. 1985). 
65 Krout, 66 F.3d at 1426. Under the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court inquires whether the 
decision reached by the lower court was “grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.” 
Abuse of Discretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 74 F.3d 562 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury when there was no 
extensive media publicity and defendant, a police officer, was not involved in organized crime, did not attempt to 
harm jurors, and had not attempted to interfere with the judicial process); see also KEVIN M. CLERMONT, 
STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND 
ABROAD 45–46 (2013) (discussing that the abuse of discretion standard is ambiguous in theory but concrete in 
application). 
13  
 
have applied a plain error standard of review when no objection to the empanelment of an 
anonymous jury is made on the record.
66 
Although “something more” than a terrorism or 
organized-crime label is required to justify anonymity, this does not appear to be a particularly 
demanding finding to make.
67 
Logistically, one way in which courts preserve juror anonymity is 
by employing marshals who transport jurors from an undisclosed location to the courthouse.
68
 
The heavily followed and publicized trial of former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards and 
 
several others illustrates the application of the majority rule in the modern context: anonymous 
juries—no longer confined to organized-crime trials—empaneled amid concerns about juror 
privacy and harassment.
69 
Edwards, an infamous politician,
70 
and his co-defendants, some of 
whom were other government officials, were indicted on charges that included “numerous counts 
of conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, insurance fraud, making false statements, and witness 
tampering.”
71   
The United States moved for an anonymous jury, and the defendants opposed the 
 
 
 
66 See, e.g., United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012). A plain error is a substantial error that 
if left uncorrected violates due process and damages the integrity of the judicial process. Plain Error, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); CLERMONT, supra note 65, at 45–46 (“The power to 
reverse for plain error is an exception to the adversary principle of party-presentation.”). 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 809 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that defendant’s 
alleged association with an organized crime family that had a history of interference with the judicial process 
justified empanelment of an anonymous jury); see also United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(“This ‘something more’ can be a demonstrable history or likelihood of obstruction of justice on the part of the 
defendant or a showing that trial evidence will depict a pattern of violence by the defendant[] . . . such as would 
cause a juror to reasonably fear for his own safety.”). 
68 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994).  Another way to preserve juror 
anonymity is by the aforementioned “numbers jury”: the court assigns each juror a number and only refers to the 
juror by that number during the trial. 
69 United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001). 
70 Since beginning his political career in 1954, Edwin Edwards has been a colorful and controversial state 
senator, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, and a four-term governor of Louisiana; ultimately, he 
served eight years in prison after being found guilty of racketeering charges. See Bill Nichols, Edwin Edwards’ Last 
Stand, POLITICO (Apr. 10, 2014 5:05 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/edwin-edwards-louisiana-2014- 
elections-105563 (reporting 86-year-old Edwards’ post-prison campaign for Congress); see also Sean Sullivan, The 
Greatest Quotes of Edwin Edwards, WASH. POST. (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the- 
fix/wp/2014/02/20/edwin-edwardss-greatest-hits-crooks-super-pacs-and-viagra/ (“I will be a model prisoner as I was 
a model citizen.”). 
71 Brown, 250 F.3d at 910. 
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motion.
72 
The district court discussed three factors that justified empanelment of an anonymous 
jury: the defendants attempted to interfere with the judicial process through witness tampering, 
attempted to bribe a judge, and attempted to illegally terminate a federal investigation; the 
defendants faced potentially lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary penalties; and that 
this case and other related trials received extensive publicity.
73 
Remarkably, there were neither 
elements of organized crime nor physical danger toward the potential jurors;
74 
the district court, 
nevertheless, granted the motion and empaneled an anonymous jury.
75 
Indeed, the district court 
was particularly concerned with juror privacy and harassment concerns when noting that in a 
previous, related trial the media “aggressively followed, identified, and contacted jurors in 
violation of the anonymous jury order” and that the media’s conduct “strongly counsels the 
Court to protect the panel from foreseeable harassment by the media and others.”
76 
Although the 
anonymous jury was not challenged on appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that, due in part to “very 
real threats were posed by excessive media coverage,” the trial judge’s decision to empanel an 
anonymous jury was appropriate.
77
 
B. State Courts 
 
In keeping with their role as laboratories of democracy,
78  
states generally exhibit a more 
 
 
 
 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Whether a group of government officials abusing their positions for ill-gotten gains constitutes organized 
crime is a question beyond the scope of this Note. 
75 Brown, 250 F.3d at 910 (withholding jurors’ names, addresses, and places of employment). 
76 Id. at 911. 
77 See id. at 922. 
78 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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diverse approach to anonymous juries. At present, a considerable number of states permit or 
allow the possibility of anonymous juries through either a statutory or common law grant of 
power to the trial judge, illustrated in Figure 1.
79
 
Figure 1: Anonymous Juries Among States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some states, like Tennessee and Utah, have simply adopted the majority federal test.
80  
Other states, like Minnesota, expressly provide a framework for empaneling anonymous juries in 
their rules of criminal procedure.
81   
In a similar vein, California provides a statutory path toward 
 
79 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 237 (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-136 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
10, § 4513 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 612-18 to -27 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 2-220 (2017); IND. CODE. 
§ 33-28-5-12 (2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1254-B (2017); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-202 
(West 2017); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02; MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-32 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-09 (2017); 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 18; State v. Rodriguez, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0659, 2017 WL 443528, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 
2017); Perez v. People, 302 P.3d 222 (Colo. 2013); Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735 (Del. 1990); State v. 
Samonte, 928 P.2d 1 (Haw. 1996); People v. Collins, 813 N.E.2d 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Green v. State, 994 
N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Robinson, 363 P.3d 875 (Kan. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 164 (2016); 
Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. 1993); People v. Williams, 616 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2000); Golnick v. Callender, 860 N.W.2d 180 (Neb. 2015); State v. Hill, 749 N.E.2d 274 (Ohio 2001); State v. 
Washington, 330 P.3d 596 (Or. 2014); Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892 (Pa. 2007); State v. Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 
132 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 914 (2006); State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628 (Utah 2007); State v. Thompson, 
No. 23805-5-II, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 49, at *10 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Tucker, 657 N.W.2d 374 (Wis. 
2003). In past years, legislators in Connecticut and New Jersey have introduced bills regarding anonymous juries, 
but they were not enacted. See H.B. 5841, 2015 Leg., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015) (proposing complete anonymity to 
prospective jurors in criminal cases); Assemb. B. 1776, 213th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2008) (proposing procedure for 
empaneling anonymous juries).  Interestingly, although Louisiana courts have not empaneled anonymous juries, 
they have expressly used factors from the majority federal test when determining whether to disclose the identity of 
a witness to a defendant.  See State v. Le, 188 So. 3d 1072, 1080 (La. Ct. App. 2015). 
80 See Ivy, 188 S.W.3d at 144; Ross, 174 P.3d at 636–38. 
81 See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02 (allowing anonymous jury empanelment but requiring, among other things, 
detailed findings of fact supporting the empanelment). 
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juror information post-verdict: any person, upon a showing of good cause, may access withheld 
juror information unless there is a “compelling interest against disclosure.”
82 
Indeed, the 
principles underlying the use of anonymous juries in state courts are consonant with the 
principles in federal courts. State courts, generally, look toward whether protecting the jurors 
from danger, intimidation, or harassment justifies the risk toward infringing the defendant’s 
presumption of innocence.
83
 
New York, however, counts itself among the states that currently bar the use of anonymous 
 
juries.
84 
Its state courts have construed their jury selection statute, section 270.15 of the New 
York Criminal Procedure Law, to generally allow judges to only withhold juror addresses; they 
are, on the other hand, prohibited from withholding juror names.
85   
Indeed, a recent case, People 
v. Flores, appeared to be the paradigmatic case for empaneling an anonymous jury.  There, the 
 
trial judge sua sponte empaneled an anonymous jury in a criminal case involving four defendants 
reputed to be violent gang members.
86 
The appellate court, on appeal, held that the anonymous 
jury violated the defendants’ right to a fair trial.
87 
More notable than the majority’s decision, 
however, was Judge Dillon’s dissent. He began by first noting that an anonymous jury had 
already been empaneled in a New York court before the passage of section 270.15.
88 
Moreover, 
legislative intent indicated that section 270.15 was meant to safeguard prospective jurors in 
 
 
 
82 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 237(b) (2017) (explaining that a compelling interest against disclosure includes, 
among other things, protecting jurors from threats or danger of physical harm). 
83 See Robinson, 363 P.3d at 198–200.  State courts, like federal courts, allow the use of curative jury 
instructions as a means with which to minimize prejudice against the defendant.  E.g., id. at 197. 
84 See People v. Flores, 153 A.D.3d 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
85 See id. at 188. 
86 See id. at 184–85. 
87 See id. at 188. 
88 Id. at 206 (Dillon, J.P., dissenting). 
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criminal cases who faced credible threats of “harm, intimidation, or bribery” and to let them 
serve as jurors without fear of repercussions.
89 
But that salutary purpose, as Judge Dillon aptly 
notes, is frustrated by that very statute in the age of ubiquitous, Internet-connected devices and 
the prevalence of social media. A juror’s address may yield a juror’s “family relationships, 
employment details, and general background information[, all] immediately obtained at the 
courthouse.”
90 
In other words, statutory construction underpinned by an understanding of 20th 
century technology is outdated when a wealth of juror information is one click away. Although 
his fellow judges were unpersuaded, Judge Dillon’s dissent may prove convincing elsewhere— 
the court, after reversing the trial court and ordering a new trial, sua sponte granted the 
prosecution leave to appeal its decision to the New York Court of Appeals.
91 
If appealed, it will 
be the first time New York’s highest court considers the issue of anonymous juries.
92
 
Anonymous juries are empaneled among state and federal courts.  Though the federal and 
 
state courts that allow anonymous juries exhibit some variations among the tests used to empanel 
one, the tests are generally characterized by a broad grant of discretion to the trial judge. This, of 
course, allows the trial court to tailor procedures to meet the circumstances of the case before 
them. Yet concerns remain regarding the use of anonymous juries. Indeed, their use implicates 
interests beyond the courtroom. 
 
89 Id. at 201. 
90 See id. at 207. 
91 Id. at 215 (granting permission to appeal pursuant to section 5602 of the New York Civil Practice Law and 
Rules). The Second Department’s unusual procedural move perhaps underscores the significance of this case. In 
contrast with the more well-known writ of certiorari process in the federal system, parties can ask New York 
appellate courts for a grant to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals; but an appellate court’s sua sponte grant to 
appeal, although possible, is seldom seen and should be done “sparingly.”  See Rob Rosborough, Second 
Department Grants Leave to Appeal to Court of Appeals Sua Sponte. Can It Do That?, N.Y. APPEALS (July 6, 
2017), https://nysappeals.com/2017/07/06/second-department-grants-leave-to-appeal-to-court-of-appeals-sua- 
sponte-can-it-do-that/ (analyzing the issue and noting that the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, which the 
Flores court cited in its grant to appeal, is normally inapplicable in a criminal case like Flores). 
92 See Flores, 153 A.D.3d at 208. 
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III 
 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANONYMOUS JURIES 
 
Anonymous juries, by their very name, instantly evoke consideration for one actor within 
the judicial system—the jury. And understandably so. Concerns over juror safety, harassment, 
and undue influence provided the impetus for their creation.
93 
But juries serve a broader 
purpose: they infuse a trial with community values, they signal legitimacy toward society, and 
their judgments prompt civic and political debate.
94 
Indeed, juries implicate interests of the 
parties, the public, the court, and the jurors themselves.
95 
Understanding these implications is 
necessary to understanding the anonymous jury’s place within the American legal system. 
 
A. The Parties 
 
Anonymous juries, at their most immediate, affect the parties to the trial in which an 
anonymous jury is empaneled, and perhaps no consideration is more crucial than the defendant’s 
presumption of innocence stemming from their Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial,
96 
but 
anonymity may introduce deleterious effects.  Jurors, as some scholars note, may arrive to court 
 
 
 
93 See supra notes 46–59 and accompanying text. 
94 See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
95 See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 12–17. 
96 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in 
favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of 
the administration of our criminal law.” (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895))). Indeed, the 
presumption of innocence is an ancient, bedrock principle worldwide. See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I, § 11(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (“[Persons are] presumed innocent until proven guilty.”); 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 29 (“[Every individual is presumed innocent until he is proved to 
be legally guilty.]”); Art. 27 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“[A defendant shall be considered not guilty until a final 
sentence has been passed.]”); KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 49 (Russ.) 
(“[Everyone accused of committing a crime shall be considered innocent until his guilt is proved.]”); G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 11 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“[Everyone] has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty.”); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 48, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 
O.J. (C. 364) 1, 20 (“[Everyone] shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty.”); DIG. 22.3.2 (Paul, Edict 69) 
(“Proof lies on him who asserts, not on him who denies.”). 
19  
 
emotionally predisposed against jury duty—they might be angry, upset, or uncertain
97
—and 
those emotions affect their decisionmaking.
98 
Anonymity, in this heightened emotional state, 
fuels further uncertainty; after all, anonymity does not comport with common views of juries.
99 
These feelings are further fueled by the trial itself; a juror might wonder, in a numbers jury for 
example, what the defendant did to merit such a procedure. Indeed, anonymity “rais[es] the 
specter that the defendant is a dangerous person from whom the jurors must be protected.”
100 
Thus, although the Supreme Court has yet to directly address anonymous juries, courts should be 
exceedingly mindful about the risk toward the defendant’s presumption of innocence. 
Furthermore, an anonymous jury—especially its more anonymizing forms—affects the 
parties’ trial strategy in myriad ways. Lawyers, from the outset, attempt to build rapport and a 
narrative of their case from voir dire onwards.
101  
Additionally, they consider jurors’ 
predilections and beliefs when it comes to presenting evidence and witnesses
102
—a particularly 
crucial consideration given that evidence is virtually a determinative factor for juror deliberation 
and decisionmaking.
103   
To be sure, a judge may conduct voir dire and provide the parties with 
 
 
97 See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 24–26 (discussing, among other studies, one survey finding that 
25% of venirepersons found jury duty inconvenient and another finding that disruptions to daily routines were 
among the top sources of stress for jurors). 
98 See id. at 242–46 (discussing how several types of emotions, including emotions that do not arise out of the 
trial itself, affects jurors’ perceptions). 
99 See id. at 18–23. 
100 See United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1048 (11th Cir. 2005) (Barkett, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
101 See generally MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY (2008) 
(describing voir dire as the first opportunity to make a favorable impression upon potential jurors and emphasizing 
the crucial need for a sound voir dire strategy). 
102 See id. at 51–52 (discussing the need for evidence that comports with the jury’s common sense). 
103 See Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive 
Damages, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 300–01 (1998) (finding in one study that evidence is the most common 
deliberation topic, accounting for 36% of deliberation time); Ann Burnett Pettus, “The Verdict Is In: A Study of Jury 
Decisionmaking Factors, Moment of Personal Decision, and Jury Deliberations—From the Jurors’ Point of View,” 
38 COMM. Q. 83, 88 (1990) (finding in one study that evidence and witnesses are the two most frequently cited 
influences on juror verdicts). 
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non-identifying juror information that compensates for their paucity of knowledge. But a judge, 
rightly concerned with chiefly assuring the impartiality of the jury, will likely provide less and 
less relevant information to the parties, who are concerned with ferreting out advantageous 
partiality during voir dire.  Consider, moreover, recent technological developments like 
sentiment analysis: algorithms that analyze vast amounts of text and data to determine the 
opinions, sentiments, and emotions expressed therein.
104 
This technology is already incorporated 
in software services that allow counsel to thoroughly search jurors’ online presence, revealing 
their social media profiles, work experience, interests, and even personalities.
105 
Indeed, those 
services could be used to discover juror biases or prejudices that rise to a level of a strike for 
cause; but against an anonymous jury, these tools are effectively neutralized. Additionally, 
peremptory challenges are also hampered when an anonymous jury is empaneled: parties, 
lacking identifying juror information, must rely on information from a voir dire conducted solely 
by the judge. In sum, anonymity casts a shadow both on the defendant’s presumption of 
innocence but also on practical trial considerations, and that may have public repercussions. 
 
B. The Public 
 
The First Amendment, in addition to granting the freedoms of religion and speech, grants 
the public a constitutional right to access criminal trials, a right applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
106   
This right, as the Supreme Court has explained, serves to legitimize 
 
 
 
104 See Bing Liu, Sentiment Analysis and Subjectivity, in HANDBOOK OF NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 627, 
629 (Nitin Indurkhya & Fred J. Damerau eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
105 See, e.g., VIJILENT, https://www.vijilent.com/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2017) (offering comprehensive profiles of 
individuals created by “powerful” tools that gather “thousands of data points” from “thousands of sources”). 
106 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573–80 (1980) (noting a long history of presumptive 
openness in criminal trials). 
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the criminal justice system; it guarantees both the “basic fairness” and the “appearance of 
fairness” of the criminal trial.
107 
An anonymous jury necessarily casts a shroud over a trial and 
consequently implicates these constitutional considerations. An anonymous jury hinders the 
media from fully reporting on a criminal trial, which in turn hinders the ability for society to 
collectively deliberate over the judgments of a jury and decisions of a court. In fact, thorough 
reporting has functioned as a check on judicial proceedings, uncovering impropriety and biases 
that otherwise would have remained hidden.
108 
Furthermore, one study found that more than half 
of jurors surveyed felt better toward the justice system after serving,
109 
another found that 
venirepersons who understood why they were dismissed accorded greater legitimacy toward voir 
dire,
110 
and yet another found that a consequential jury experience enhances civic engagement.
111 
An anonymous jury may impact these salutary effects.  Serving on an anonymous jury 
necessarily involves a more cloistered experience, one that does not offer the juror the full 
spectrum of jury service. In fact, Gastil and others have found that jurors’ cognitive engagement 
during the trial was a key aspect toward their resultant confidence in the jury system, pride in 
their civic service, and faith in civic institutions;
112 
but, as explained below, anonymous juries 
may involve psychological effects that result in decreased cognitive engagement.
113 
In this way, 
anonymity might result in detrimental effects on civic engagement.  Additionally, potential jurors 
 
 
 
107 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984). 
108 See William R. Montross, Jr. & Patrick Mulvaney, Virtue and Vice: Who Will Report on the Failings of the 
American Criminal Justice System?, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1429, 1438–42 (2009). 
109 See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 27. 
110 See Mary R. Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to Jurors’ Views Regarding the Peremptory 
Challenge, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1061, 1094–98 (2003). 
111 See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 30. 
112 See GASTIL ET AL., supra note 19, at 174–76. 
113 See infra notes 125–133 and accompanying text. 
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dismissed after a restrictive voir dire process might not be given a full or satisfactory reason for 
their dismissal because of potential privacy concerns. Indeed, an anonymous juror—under the 
specter of danger that anonymity may bring—might lose out on the sense of agency and 
responsibility-taking that result in a meaningful jury experience.
114 
In sum, anonymous juries 
partly shroud a criminal trial and may blunt the beneficial effects toward civic engagement, thus 
affecting the legitimacy of the verdict, a condition “essential to respect for the rule of law.”
115
 
C. The Court 
 
The majority of jurisdictions that commit empaneling anonymous juries to a trial court’s 
discretion raise questions of consistency across adjudications, uniformity across outcomes, and 
quality across judgments. Judicial discretion, essentially, constitutes the broad latitude by the 
decisionmaker to determine a “correct” outcome—without being constrained by bright-line rules 
of decision—based upon a set of conditions present or absent in the instant case, and it is 
pervasive across our legal system.
116 
Discretion is beneficial because it allows judges—those 
closest to the facts and conditions of the case—to respond to unforeseen complications and to 
best effectuate the spirit of the law itself.
117   
But there are, however, issues that militate against 
 
114 See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 29. 
115 See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017). 
116 See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1562–70 (2003); see 
also Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824) (“When [courts] are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere 
legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law.”); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 630–32 (1994) 
(contending that judges prefer greater discretion). There are, however, legislative efforts in at least one state to 
curtail the discretion trial judges enjoy. See Press Release, Ash Kalra, Bill to Foster Fair Juries Authored by 
Assemblymember Ash Kalra Signed Into Law by Governor (Sept. 27, 2017), https://a27.asmdc.org/press- 
release/bill-foster-fair-juries-authored-assemblymember-ash-kalra-signed-law-governor (announcing passage of 
Californian legislation that requires courts to allow “liberal and probing” questioning of venirepersons by counsel). 
Judicial efforts are, remarkably, likewise underway. See Maura Ewing, A Judicial Pact to Cut Court Costs for the 
Poor, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/court-fines-north- 
carolina/548960/ (reporting a commitment by trial judges in North Carolina to consult a “bench card” that reminds 
them to fully assess a defendant’s ability to pay before setting a fine or fee). 
117 See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 
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broad discretion: among others, the psychological concepts of bounded rationality and 
information access. Bounded rationality describes the issue of systemic biases being introduced 
into a decision when decisionmakers, faced with complex decisions, use heuristics to guide 
decisionmaking.
118 
Moreover, information access describes the problem a judge faces when they 
act on an incomplete factual record; when a judge, for example, makes a decision before all the 
facts have been introduced and subject to adversarial proceedings at trial.
119 
These problems are 
particularly acute in the anonymous jury context, especially because a judge might be tasked 
with empaneling an anonymous jury as early as voir dire. To be sure, there may be dispositive 
facts; for example, a previous criminal verdict and overwhelming evidence of continued gang 
affiliation. But when the judge must balance the risk toward the jury against the infringement of 
the defendant’s presumption of innocence and the judge has limited facts, there is the 
opportunity that systemic bias occurs if the judge looks toward some of the factors commonly 
used like, for example, whether defendants are involved in organized crime, their participation in 
a group with capacity to harm jurors, or the potential that they will suffer lengthy incarceration 
or monetary penalties.
120 
In these cases, a judge drifts perilously close to prejudging the merits 
of the case.
121 
For example, whether a defendant is involved in organized crime is a conclusory 
fact that ought to be determined by the factfinder, not the presiding judge, at the end of an 
adversarial proceeding and after each party has been given all the process that they are due. 
Moreover, the factor that looks toward sentence length or penalty is nonsensical because federal 
 
 
1965–70 (2007). 
118 See CLERMONT, supra note 65, at 61–71; Bone, supra note 117, at 1987–91. 
119 See Bone, supra note 117, at 1991–97; Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 241–42 (1998). 
120 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
121 See generally CLERMONT, supra note 65, at 12 (providing examples among various legal tests that require 
judges to evaluate the probability of a future event occurring). 
24  
 
crimes routinely result in potentially lengthy incarcerations;
122 
thus, a defendant accused of a 
federal crime might face an anonymous jury as a matter of course. Broad discretion thus has the 
potential to introduce systemic biases into a trial judge’s decisionmaking because they are faced 
with obstacles—more so earlier in the trial—that open the door to undue influence placed on 
incomplete information or bias-prone test factors. Resultantly, this discretion introduces 
inconsistency across adjudications because of the minimal constraints placed upon judges when 
they decide whether to empanel an anonymous jury; that inconsistency, in turn, affects the 
quality of judgments because similar cases run a greater risk of not being treated alike.
123
 
D. The Jury 
 
To be sure, anonymity provides benefits that ultimately redound toward increased juror 
safety. Jurors often express concerns over whether their personal information will be available 
to the defendant or the public,
124 
and an anonymous jury provides a remedy to these 
understandable fears. Furthermore, anonymity, in a general sense, aids in reducing certain 
stressors associated with jury service; for example, anonymous jurors are not exposed to 
publicity nor are they faced with potentially probing intrusions into their personal life. 
The potentially concerning effects of anonymity, however, ought to make courts strongly 
consider other alternatives before empaneling an anonymous jury. One notable mock jury 
experiment studying the impacts of anonymity on juror decisionmaking reported that anonymous 
 
 
122 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCING 
ENHANCEMENTS 34 (2016) (noting that the average sentence imposed for some defendants found guilty of federal 
crimes is 145 months); see also THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PRISON TIME SURGES FOR FEDERAL INMATES 1–3 
(2015) (illustrating that the average prison time served by federal inmates more than doubled from 1988 to 2012). 
123 See Joshua B. Fischman, Measuring Inconsistency, Indeterminacy, and Error in Adjudication, 16 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 40, 44–45 (2014). 
124 See United States v. Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152, 1155–56 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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jurors returned approximately 15% more guilty verdicts than their non-anonymous 
counterparts.
125 
In fact, that same study gave different sets of anonymous jurors different 
curative instructions: one instruction stated that anonymity was meant to protect jurors from 
outside harassment and the other stated anonymity was meant to protect the jurors’ safety.
126 
That study found that neither instruction significantly affected the verdicts anonymous juries 
rendered
127
—in other words, the curative instruction did not have the curative effect that courts 
assumed it would have. This is, of course, worrying; it calls into question the efficacy that 
curative instructions have when it comes to ameliorating the effects of anonymity. 
Moreover, anonymity necessarily results in deindividuation—the loss of self-awareness in 
groups
128
—which may result in undifferentiated decisionmaking performance within a group, 
thus resulting in social loafing, groupthink, and, ultimately, impaired juror accountability. 
Undifferentiated performance occurs when individuals within a group no longer feel a sense of 
distinct identities and roles;
129 
an acute concern when individuals are anonymously empaneled. 
This results in some concerning repercussions: social loafing—the tendency for people to reduce 
effort in a group—and groupthink—the tendency for groups to uncritically converge upon the 
same conclusions by using the same assumptions and decisionmaking processes—both are 
heightened in undifferentiated groups.
130   
A jury is already quite susceptible to group 
 
 
125 See D. Lynn Hazelwood & John C. Brigham, The Effects of Juror Anonymity on Jury Verdicts, 22 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 695, 704 (1998). 
126 See id. at 701–02. 
127 See id. at 703. 
128 See Philip G. Zimbardo, A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good 
People Are Transformed Into Perpetrators, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 21, 29–30 (Arthur G. 
Miller ed., 2004). 
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decisionmaking biases and pressures,
131 
and anonymity may not only exacerbate those issues but 
also introduce new complications. Indeed, given that cases in which anonymous juries are used 
are often criminal cases involving the loss of liberty, a juror might already feel disinclined to 
voice an opinion in this fraught context, and would be even more susceptible to being swayed by 
the majority group decisionmaking process. In this way, an individual anonymous juror might 
feel less accountable for the ultimate verdict; not only because they are anonymous but because 
the anonymity has detrimentally impacted their decisionmaking process.  And the lack of 
accountability—that is, the lack of an expectation to define one’s beliefs
132
—further impairs 
decisionmaking because accountability “emphasizes the responsibility of individuals to behave 
autonomously and present a valid basis for their actions.”
133 
These are acute concerns in 
anonymous juries, and additional measures ought to be taken to ameliorate these detrimental 
effects. 
 
IV 
 
A PROPOSED SOLUTION & APPLICATION 
 
A. Adopting the Seventh Circuit’s Approach and Employing Reasoned Verdicts 
 
In their present iteration, anonymous juries are empaneled in cases seemingly removed from 
the chief issue first identified in Barnes: juror safety. Now, anonymous juries are empaneled in 
cases where the chief concern revolves around juror influence from the public or media. 
Moreover, the seemingly endless variations of an anonymous jury mean that the same test can 
 
 
 
131 See, e.g., BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 4, at 40–47 (discussing the role explicit and implicit biases play 
in juror decisionmaking). 
132 See Baumeister et al., supra note 129, at 5–7. 
133 Id. 
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result in little anonymized information or, on the other extreme, complete anonymity.
134 
Additionally, the concerns regarding accountability and deindividuation are at their zenith when 
jurors know that their information is anonymized. In effect, they cease to become the 
representation of their community because there ceases to be any opportunity for accountability; 
the community, if it disagrees with the result reached, cannot have a thorough, meaningful 
debate over the decision because the verdict stands alone as the only piece of information. The 
incidental trappings of a verdict—conversations about the jurors’ identities, their reactions, their 
questions on the record—are restricted with an anonymous jury. Indeed, the anonymous jury in 
Barnes was unsuccessful in preventing outside juror influence—one of the jurors was 
successfully bribed by Barnes and the co-defendants.
135 
Anonymity, ironically, made it more 
difficult to detect this tampering. In response to these concerns, this Note proposes an adoption 
of the Seventh Circuit’s approach to juror anonymity and the use of reasoned verdicts when 
anonymous juries are empaneled. 
The various configurations of anonymity result in the majority test—chiefly focused on the 
balance between the jurors’ interests and the defendant’s interests—being employed when the 
defendant in fact has all of the jurors’ information. This mismatch has been addressed in the 
Seventh Circuit.  There, before applying the majority test, the court begins with a threshold 
 
 
134 This is not unlike the problem of “smooth” and “bumpy” laws, as one scholar terms it: a smooth law is one in 
which a gradual change in legal input is reflected by a gradual change in legal output; a bumpy law is one in which a 
gradual change in legal input either dramatically affects legal output or does not affect it at all. Applied to the 
majority test for anonymous juries, the range of legal inputs bears no real relationship to the type of anonymity that 
results. In other words, a judge may find one factor present and accordingly order a completely anonymous jury; 
another judge may find all the factors present and simply order an innominate jury. See generally Adam J. Kolber, 
Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 655 (2014) (describing, among other things, how smooth laws create 
consistency in adjudications and better preserve morally relevant information than bumpy laws). 
135 After a co-defendant, Fisher, found out that an acquaintance had been selected as a juror, Barnes and the 
other co-defendants paid $75,000 in exchange for not guilty votes. But Fisher, unbeknownst to Barnes at the time, 
betrayed Barnes and the other co-defendants by instructing that juror to vote not guilty only for Fisher and not for 
the rest of the co-defendants.  Keleher, supra note 59. 
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question: what kind of anonymity is involved—anonymity with regards to the defendant not 
knowing juror information, or anonymity with regards to the public not knowing juror 
information?
136 
The former is termed an anonymous jury; the latter is termed a confidential 
jury.
137 
If an anonymous jury is requested or the court determines that an anonymous jury might 
be required, then it applies the majority federal test.
138   
If the court finds that a confidential jury 
is at issue, then it applies an analysis that focuses on the public’s common-law right of access to 
judicial records.
139 
The confidential jury test presumes that disclosure of judicial records is 
favorable over nondisclosure.
140 
This presumption derives from the common-law tradition of 
open litigation,
141 
but it is not absolute and may be overcome by an analysis turning on whether 
the public’s access to judicial records was properly denied;
142 
a court considers “the need for 
accountability of the otherwise independent judiciary, the need of the public to have confidence 
in the effective administration of justice, and the need for civic debate and behavior to be 
informed.”
143 
This approach clearly demarcates which interests are most implicated, provides 
structure to the types of anonymity at issue, and correctly focuses on the underlying issues in 
each case—the defendant’s due process rights in an anonymous jury analysis, and the public’s 
 
136 See United States v. Harris, 763 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2014). 
137 Id. The Seventh Circuit, however, has not definitely decided what constitutes an anonymous jury; it notes 
that, at least, “one necessary component that must be withheld from the parties is the jurors’ names.” Id. at 885. 
Given the concerns regarding juror accountability, potential infringements on the defendant’s presumption of 
innocence, and the vast amount of information that may be found with just a juror’s name, this somewhat lax 
definition of anonymity is ideal for the purposes of triggering anonymous jury analysis under the majority test. 
138 Id. 
139 See id. The Third Circuit has sometimes applied a First Amendment “experience and logic” test and held that 
the media has a First Amendment right of access to the names and addresses of prospective jurors.  See United 
States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 238 (3d Cir. 2008). But see Seth A. Fersko, Note, United States v. Wecht: When 
Anonymous Juries, the Right of Access, and Judicial Discretion Collide, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 763, 768 (2010) 
(contending that the Third Circuit improperly applied the “experience and logic” test to the issue in Wecht). 
140 See United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010). 
141 See id. 
142 See Harris, 763 F.3d at 886. 
143 See United States v. Sonin, 167 F. Supp. 3d 971, 974–75 (E.D. Wis. 2016). 
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access to courts in a confidential jury analysis.
144 
Additionally, a clear distinction between an 
anonymous and a confidential jury avoids the confusion that sometimes arises when a reviewing 
court must figure out what type of anonymity was used in the lower court.
145 
Moreover, this 
approach provides greater consistency in adjudications, as parties will have a better idea of what 
kind of anonymity they might face and can conform their behavior accordingly, which minimizes 
potentially costly error costs and increases judicial efficiency.
146
 
Finally, a form of reasoned verdicts—the requirement that the jury give explanations for its 
 
decisions
147
—should be required when an anonymous jury or a confidential jury is empaneled. 
Anonymous jurors would be required to give their conclusions regarding the verdict, what 
considerations led to that conclusion, why they were or were not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and any other considerations that guided their decisionmaking.
148 
Reasoned verdicts, 
importantly, protect both the defendant’s right to a fair trial by safeguarding against any arbitrary 
and capricious actions by the jury and the public’s interest in legitimate verdicts.
149 
In this way, 
even though the public might be faced with an anonymous jury, they nevertheless have the 
reasons regarding their decision, which allows for public debate and deliberation that allows 
“judgments [to] find acceptance in the community.”
150 
To be sure, reasoned verdicts in criminal 
trials, akin to special verdicts, implicate the constitutional right to have a jury render a final 
 
 
 
144 See Harris, 763 F.3d at 886. 
145 See State v. Rodriguez, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0659, 2017 WL 443528, at *2–8 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017) 
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verdict.
151 
Juries, as the argument goes, must remain independent and flexible in their pursuit of 
justice; requiring explanations risks burdening those aims.
152 
But there is empirical research 
finding that when written findings are required, jurors feel more informed and confident in the 
verdict reached.
153 
Moreover, there is a distinction between safeguarding juries’ independence 
and requiring findings regarding specific elements of a crime; here, a jury’s independence is not 
necessarily extinguished because they ultimately retain the power to render a guilty or not guilty 
verdict regardless of the elements of the crime.
154 
Indeed, there is another key benefit behind 
reasoned verdicts: accountability. Reasoned verdicts emphasize responsibility among 
individuals, and behoove the individual to take agency for their own decisions, effectively 
blunting some of the detrimental effects of deindividuation.
155 
By putting the impetus on the 
individual juror to provide their own reasons behind their decision, reasoned verdicts stymie the 
effects of social loafing—because the juror must provide their own reasons behind their 
decision—and groupthink—because there is less of a chance that the juror will simply and 
uncritically adopt the decisionmaking processes of the majority. A more developed record is an 
additional boon, facilitating public debate over a decision or bolstering a record for purposes of 
an appellate challenge, should the information be released. 
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B.   An Example: Cases of Law Enforcement Violence 
 
Applying this Note’s proposed solution to an increasingly prominent context is instructive. 
In recent years, there has been a rise in high-profile, police-related deaths, particularly of black 
Americans, and anonymous juries have subsequently been empaneled.
156 
These trials typically 
entail expansive and high-profile publicity, including public demonstrations.
157 
Generally, these 
cases involve police officers, who have not been involved in organized crime, have not 
previously attempted to interfere with the judicial process, and have not previously participated 
in a group with the capacity to harm jurors. Indeed, the officers involved in the death of Freddie 
Gray exemplify the typical officer; all have years of experience serving as officers.
158 
Yet in the 
case of one of the police officers charged in Freddie Gray’s death, the judge ordered an 
anonymous jury because of “intense media scrutiny” that might expose jurors to “unwanted 
publicity or harassment.”
159
 
Applying the majority federal test for anonymous juries in this context—that is, based on the 
 
amount of publicity and not concerns over juror safety—means that a finding of high-profile 
publicity is enough to anonymize information from both the parties and the public. In other 
words, the parties’ access to jurors’ identities is a collateral casualty of high-profile publicity. 
The prosecution is stymied from advantages conferred by juror information not because a 
defendant poses a risk to juror safety that justifies an anonymous jury but because of high-profile 
publicity.  But the Seventh Circuit’s approach would result in a materially different outcome. 
 
156 See Johnson, supra note 15. 
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158 Paul Schwartzman, Accused Officers Have Wide Range of Experience, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), 
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Under the Seventh Circuit’s approach, if an anonymous jury—that is, a jury whose information 
is withheld from the parties—is sought, the court would use the majority federal test and likely 
find that anonymous jury is not warranted because the likelihood of juror harm and resultant 
harm to the judicial process from the defendant is absent.
160 
A confidential jury, however, would 
likely be empaneled; the sheer amount of national publicity in these cases overcomes the 
presumption in favor of disclosure of judicial records. Crucially, a confidential jury withholds 
juror information from the public, but not the parties—a significant difference compared to an 
anonymous jury because juror information is a key consideration in police violence cases.
161 
Additionally, reasoned verdicts aid jurors both in forming their own opinions in such a charged 
trial and fostering accountability for the ultimate verdict reached. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Anonymous juries are a potent tool. Born from a trial judge’s concern over juror safety 
against a defendant involved in organized crime, they have spread across federal and state courts 
in cases far removed from the paradigmatic organized crime case. Although the Supreme Court 
has yet to address the practice, it is likely that anonymous juries are here to stay.  Their 
usefulness in facilitating trials involving not only organized crime but heavily publicized trials of 
all stripes have made them an ideal tool in the trial judge’s toolbox.  Indeed, bastions 
traditionally against the practice, like New York, appear to be on the verge of reconsidering their 
long-held proscription against anonymous juries.  But there are concerns regarding the 
 
160 Indeed, the police officer defendants here are not dissimilar to the police officer defendant in United States v. 
Sanchez.  There, the Fifth Circuit found that an anonymous jury was not warranted where a police officer, accused 
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defendant’s presumption of innocence, the parties’ trial strategy, the court’s broad discretion, the 
public’s concern over legitimacy of verdicts, and the jury’s accountability with regards to 
anonymous decisionmaking. By adopting the Seventh Circuit’s test that demarcates between 
anonymous and confidential juries and requiring reasoned verdicts when an anonymous jury is 
empaneled, anonymous juries can be an “inspired, trusted, and effective” instrument of justice.
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